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A B S t r A c t
The following reflections are intended as a preliminary to a more extended and 
in-depth series of case studies, focused analyses of actual artworks, and the issues 
arising from their particularity within what will be described here as a Heideggerian 
post-aesthetic aesthetics. The essay is not written from the perspective of a professional 
or academic philosopher or of a practising artist (even though I am one), neither fields of 
which have sufficiently engaged with the existential and aesthetic predicament sketched 
out below. Thus, the attraction of both Heidegger and Blanchot is not just related to 
their well-known discussions of inbetween-ness, but, more essentially, to the peculiarly 
in-between location of their own thought and trajectory of thinking: Heidegger from 
“out of” philosophy “drawn” towards art; Blanchot from within the space of literature 
towards the exteriority of ontological thinking. The intention is to identify similarities 
and differences in their thought, but this is only perceived as relevant to the extent that 
it allows an initial reassessment of a de-subjectivized  existential and aesthetic mode 
of thinking that has been largely abandoned by academic philosophy and art practice 
alike (albeit for very different reasons). If nothing else, the hope is that a different voice 
might be heard in the clamorous exchange between philosopher and artists, one that 
is sensitive to the complex predicament of the artist in a post-Heidegerrian world, and 
which above all remains faithful to the project of the artist and the artwork in the face 
of the philosophical valorization of “Art”.
k e y w o r d s
Art, solitude, loneliness, affirmation, preservation, creation, questioning, attunement.
r e S u m e n
Las siguientes reflexiones se presentan como preliminares a una serie de estudios 
de caso más extensos y profundos, análisis focalizados de obras de artes reales, y los 
temas que surgen de sus particularidades dentro de lo que se describirá aquí como una 
estética heideggeriana post-estética. El ensayo no está escrito desde la perspectiva de un 
filósofo profesional o académico ni de un artista operante (aunque yo lo soy), ninguno 
de cuyos campos se ha comprometido suficientemente con el dilema bosquejado más 
adelante. Así pues, la atracción de Heidegger y Blanchot no solo tiene que ver con 
sus bien conocidas discusiones sobre la inbetween-ness, sino, más esencialmente, 
con la ubicación particularmente in-between de su propio pensamiento y trayectoria 
del pensar: Heidegger desde “fuera de” la filosofía  “sacado” hacia el arte; Blanchot 
desde dentro del espacio de la literatura hacia la exterioridad del pensar ontológico. La 
intención es identificar similitudes y diferencias en su pensamiento, pero esto solo es 
percibido como relevante en la medida en que permite una reevaluación de un modo 
de pensar existencial y estético des-subjetivado, que ha sido ampliamente abando-
nado por la filosofía académica y la práctica del arte (aunque por razones distintas). 
Sin más pretensiones, la esperanza es que se pueda escuchar una voz diferente en el 
intercambio clamoroso entre el filósofo y los artistas; voz que es sensible al complejo 
dilema del artista en un mundo post-heideggeriano, y que sobre todo permanece fiel 
al proyecto del artista y a la obra de arte frente a la valorización filosófica del “Arte”.
p a l a b r a s  c l a v e
Arte, soledad, afirmación, preservación, creación, preguntar, afinamiento.
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Affirming Solitude: Heidegger And BlAncHot on Art
The more this thrust comes into the open, the stronger and 
more solitary the work becomes […].The more solitary the 
work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and the more 
cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more 
simply does the thrust come into the Open. (Heidegger, 
1971a, p. 66)
This solitude has itself  begun to speak, and I must in turn 
speak about this speaking solitude, not in derision, but becau-
se a greater solitude hovers above it, and above that solitude, 
and another still greater, and each, taking the spoken word in 
order to smother it and silence it, instead echoes it to infinity, 
and infinity becomes its echo. (Blanchot, 1978, p. 33)
The following reflections are intended as a preliminary to a 
more extended and in-depth series of case studies, focused analyses 
of actual artworks, and the issues arising from their particularity 
within what will be described here as a Heideggerian post-aesthetic 
aesthetics. The essay is not written from the perspective of a pro-
fessional or academic philosopher or of a practising artist1, neither 
fields of which have sufficiently engaged with the existential and 
aesthetic predicament sketched out below. Thus, the attraction 
of both Heidegger and Blanchot is not just related to their well-
known discussions of inbetween-ness, but, more essentially, to 
the peculiarly in-between location of their own thought and tra-
jectory of thinking: Heidegger from “out of” philosophy “drawn” 
towards art; Blanchot from within the space of literature towards 
the exteriority of ontological thinking. The intention is to identify 
similarities and differences in their thought, but this is only percei-
ved as relevant to the extent that it allows an initial reassessment 
of a de-subjectivized existential and aesthetic mode of thinking 
that has been largely abandoned by academic philosophy and art 
1 Although I am one as it happens.
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practice alike (albeit for very different reasons). If nothing else, 
the hope is that a different voice might be heard in the clamorous 
exchange between philosopher and artists, one that is sensitive to 
the complex predicament of the artist in a post-Heidegerrian world, 
and which above all remains faithful to the project of the artist and 
the artwork in the face of the philosophical valorization of “Art”.
Where Heidegger, as thinker-philosopher, describes the increasing 
solitude, and consequent inhumanity of the artwork; Blanchot, as 
writer-artist, speaks of a solitude that is integral to the very act of 
speaking. Such speech/writing does not describe but is inscribed 
by the very solitude that brings it into being. Not the solitude of 
man but the solitude of language itself as it smothers all humanity 
in the infinite echo of its own interminable delivery. So, while it 
is true that both Heidegger and Blanchot speak about this spea-
king solitude”, the thought of the former incessantly “speaks-of 
the leap from one space to another and the infinitely postponed 
commencement of an “other beginning” (Heidegger, 1999, pp. 
124-126) freed from all humanist comforts; the writing of the latter 
speaks-from within what he calls the “space of literature”, that is 
to say, from within art and through the artwork. Blanchot speaks 
as, and on behalf of, the artist, not in order to speak-of Being or 
indeed of truth but to speak-as artist and to speak-for the artwork: 
that’s the difference. In other words, the task of the philosopher 
is to think, while the task (or the curse) of the artist is to make, to 
think, but then continue to make within the transformed space 
of this thinking/making. Artists, as long as they want to remain 
artists, will always come back to the artwork. Where Heidegger 
ultimately brushes aside the artist and the artwork in the name of 
art, understood as the setting to work of truth’s unconcealment, 
Blanchot’s writing is rooted in and articulates the very experience 
of the artist being brushed aside by the artwork and by art. In a 
sense the question he addresses is: what would art be like after 
Heidegger? Or, how does the artist experience his or her own 
essential solitude and the solitude of art? 
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Having said that, it is certainly true that Blanchot’s most 
sustained engagement with the essential solitude does not in fact 
take place within what might be called his art practice (his novels) 
but within the quasi-philosophical/poetic ecriture to be found in 
such texts as The Space of  Literature and The Infinite Conversation. 
Indeed, how could such thinking and writing take place within 
the artwork when it is precisely the artwork’s solitude that creates 
the “space of literature” that comes to frame Blanchot’s singular 
writing. The “space of literature”—the space created by the 
creation of artworks—is not interior to those works (a romantic 
concoction) but, on the contrary, represents a radical exteriority, 
the “Outside” from within which the artist experiences the exile 
inherent in the creative process. At the same time, it is also the 
case that Heidegger’s speaking-of the solitude of the artwork does 
not take place within his more “traditional” philosophical texts, 
commentaries and lectures (not that many of them could really 
be described as such), but rather within the quasi-philosophical/
poetic writings of “late” works such as Contributions to Philosophy 
and Mindfulness. Prior to these works which explicitly attempt 
to think, speak and write from within or, as Heidegger expresses 
it “from out of” philosophy, he himself admits that he has only 
managed to “speak about” philosophy, without the necessary 
attunement to the solitude that such essential thinking requires. 
(Heidegger, 1995, pp. 55-56)2. In light of this, the current essay 
is far from suggesting that there should or could be identified 
any radical opposition between the work of Heidegger and Blan-
chot—such dialectical thinking would be anathema to both of 
them anyway. Clearly there are differences but these originate in 
different experiences of the same essential solitude identified by 
both and described in overlapping terms that bespeak a fascina-
ting intertwinement of philosophy and art or, to use the language 
adopted below, preservation and creation. But, to be clear, neither 
2 A perspective very much shared by Gilles Deleuze of  course.
15
Gary Peters
eidos nº19 (2013) págs. 11-38
issn 2011-7477
speak-for philosophy or art, they are both in-between and in this 
sense both share a solitude that is ultimately an essential compo-
nent of the “errant” work they produce.
But, it might be asked, who cares about all of this speaking-of, 
speaking about, speaking-from out of or within, speaking being 
the articulation of an experience that, as with all experience, 
remains incarcerated within the ontic and the existential? Well, 
perhaps here is one fundamental difference between Heidegger and 
Blanchot: the thought of the latter, for all of its famed neutrality 
and lifelong promotion of the effacement of the artist (including 
himself), still retains an existential dimension (admittedly stripped 
of its humanist trappings) which offers a rare (perhaps unique) 
aesthetic response to the anti-aesthetics of Heidegger. This, per-
haps, will help explain why, in spite of the fact that, as will be 
re-iterated below, solitude is a characteristic of the artwork and 
not the artist for both Heidegger and Blanchot, the current essay 
is repeatedly drawn into the existential orbit of the exiled artist, 
not as “loner” but simply as artist. Philosophers will no doubt read 
this as a misunderstanding of the ontological import of the essen-
tial solitude under discussion and as an inexplicable retreat into 
pre- (or sub) Heideggerian existential phenomenology: a mixture 
of intellectual confusion and cowardice. But then one might ask 
what exactly is the import of Heidegger’s infamous ontology of art 
if it remains within what we might call the “space of philosophy”? 
A conviction underlying the following reflections is that without 
an account of (yes) the existential experience of being exiled from 
one’s work, and without the aesthetic experience of creating new 
work from out of the space that this incessant process of exile crea-
tes, all talk of solitude is abstract. This is not to valorize beings 
above Being, or to perpetuate subjectivist/humanist aesthetics in 
the face of their inevitable demise; it is, rather, simply an attempt 
to speak of artists and their work in the face of art’s infinite with-
drawal —call this withdrawal truth or not, that’s not the issue 
here. This is why Blanchot consistently speaks of specific artists 
and their works, and it is why Heidegger does so only rarely (and 
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with rather mixed results). This is also why Blanchot’s experience 
of the essential solitude is an affirmative one: he, the subject, the 
writer affirms solitude. Not his own solitude but the solitude of 
the work. And the very act of affirmation, as will be described 
below, itself creates a solitude which has existential as well as 
ontological import. Heidegger, on the contrary, explicitly avoids 
both affirmation and negation, and the concomitant dialectics of 
choice, in an effort to separate his thought from the foibles of the 
existential or aesthetic act. So it might be worth trying to unravel 
some of these differences and similarities.
To repeat, the word affirmation is much used in Blanchot’s 
oeuvre, appearing in a multitude of different contexts with an 
ever shifting range of meanings. Sometimes it is the reader/re-
ceiver who affirms the work with an “innocent” or “pure yes that 
blossoms in immediacy” (Blanchot, 1983, p. 196), sometimes it 
is the writer/producer who says “yes” to the “risk” of the work’s 
solitude (Blanchot, 1983, p. 22); on other occasions it is the work 
that affirms itself from out of an anonymity which itself becomes 
an object of affirmation: “the reading of a poem is the poem itself, 
affirming itself in the reading of the work” (Blanchot, 1983, p.198). 
What is more, the explicit absence of a dialectical dimension to 
Blanchot’s manner of thinking means that the “yes” cannot be 
relied upon to immanently emerge out of its contradiction of the 
“no” as a productive praxis, but must itself be affirmed through an 
incessant affirmation of affirmation that helps explain, perhaps, 
Blanchot’s constant need to see this word on the page. Most im-
portantly of all though is the way in which Blanchot —and here 
he does resemble Heidegger— returns his thinking to a moment 
of essential affirmation, prior to the secondary choices associated 
with “yes” or “no”, to what he calls the “primordial Yes and No” 
before the beginning of the artwork.
At the very moment of  the choice art still holds us back in a 
primordial Yes and No. There, before any beginning, the somber 
ebb and flow of  dissimulation rumbles. (Blanchot, 1983, p. 244)
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The moment of choice described here is, in its primordiality, 
better described as a moment of decision where art itself is affir-
med. The simultaneous affirmation and negation that is art is 
not intended to signify a static totality where the artist can have 
it all ways, but describes, rather, the incessant movement of art, 
the ‘setting to work of truth” as described by Heidegger in terms 
of unconcealment/concealment and by Blanchot as revealing/
re-veiling. It is the primordial movement of art —the ebb and flow 
of “yes” and “no” in Blanchot’s language, the ‘strife” of “world” 
and “earth” in Heidegger’s— that produces the fascination ne-
cessary to draw both the thinker and the writer towards or into 
the solitude of this interminable approach/withdrawal. And here 
might be identified another essential difference between the thinker 
and the artist: where Heidegger always speaks of “hearkening” 
or “heeding” the “call” of truth as it withdraws and “draws” the 
thinker towards it, for Blanchot, to be fascinated is to “surrender” 
to fascination, a “yes” that both affirms the essential solitude 
while, more importantly, allowing the anonymous absence such 
solitude represents to affirm itself.
To write is to surrender to the fascination of  time’s absence. Now 
we are doubtless approaching the essence of  solitude. Time’s ab-
sence is not purely a negative mode. It is the time when nothing 
begins, when initiative is not possible, when, before the affirma-
tion, there is already a return of  the affirmation. Rather than 
a purely negative mode, it is, on the contrary, a time without 
negation, without decision, when here is nowhere as well, and 
each thing withdraws into its image while the “I” that we are 
recognizes itself  by sinking into the neutrality of  a featureless 
third person. (Blanchot, 1983, p. 30)
But then we might place alongside this “surrender” to fascina-
tion Heidegger’s “submission” to the “displacement” of art, and 
consider again the difference between artist and thinker in terms 
of the creation and preservation of the work respectively. Having 
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acknowledged the increasing solitude of the work as the “thrust” 
of its creation increasingly cuts all ties with the world, Heidegger 
then continues by proposing that the preservation of the work 
similarly requires a break with the human. It is thus the preserver 
who must “submit” to the “Open” solitude of the work, just as 
the writer, in Blanchot’s account, “surrenders” to it. This is how 
Heidegger describes it:
The more purely the work is itself  transported into the open-
ness of  beings —an openness opened by itself— the more simply 
does it transport us into this openness and thus at the same time 
transport us out of  the realm of  the ordinary. To submit to this 
displacement means: to transform our accustomed ties to the 
world and to […] this letting the work be a work we call the pre-
serving of  the work […] what is created cannot itself  come into 
being without those who preserve it. (Heidegger, 1971a, p. 66)
It is perhaps worth remarking on the difference between 
surrender and submission. The act of surrender suggests a prior 
struggle, a resistance to an overpowering force that ultimately 
demands sacrifice and renunciation. But surrender goes beyond 
mere capitulation, it also describes the act of giving up what one 
has and the handing over of what is held most dear. Blanchot’s 
language is forceful, for him the milieu of fascination is one of 
threat, of robbery, effacement and neutralisation. It is not just the 
passing over from the first to the third person —from the “I” to 
the “they”— but the passing away of everything the “I” would 
cling to as the guarantor of identity, of authorship, and of self-
recognition. The “sinking” of the artist into the neutrality of art’s 
essential solitude is not just the transformation but the obliteration 
of the “I”.
Where Heidegger’s standing-within the happening of the work 
is proposed as a post-aesthetics more essential than the subjective 
experience of a beautiful objectivity, the peculiarity of Blanchot’s 
writing suggests something resembling a post-aesthetic aesthetics 
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where the experience of the artist’s and the artwork’s dissolution 
itself becomes the object of contemplation and reflection. If the 
thinker witnesses the withdrawal of art into the solitude of truth’s 
happening and, as Heidegger requests, follows this withdrawal 
(noting the essential element of submission and obedience as-
sociated with the German word folgen), then, perhaps, the role 
of the artist is to bear witness to this witnessing, and to embrace 
the “risk” Blanchot associates with this experience. Speaking of 
Mallarmé, he writes:
This risk affects his normal relationship to the world, his habi-
tual use of  language; it destroys all ideal certainties, deprives the 
poet of  the physical assurance of  living. It exposes him finally to 
death —the death of  truth, the death of  his person. (Blanchot, 
1983, pp. 108-109) 
Blanchot here describes Mallarmé as being drawn by poetry 
into the hazardous affirmation of the impersonal where ordinary 
relations with the world are suspended, but this is more than just 
a “displacement”, it is also, to say again, the aesthetic experience of 
a displacement that transforms not just the thinker’s perspective 
on art but also the artist’s relationship with the artwork which, in 
spite of everything, will always remain. Blanchot speaks of the 
existential and aesthetic predicament of the artist, the individual 
artist, the subject. But not the solitary subject, rather the subject of 
solitude. Comparing this, the “surrender” of the artist to art with 
all of the intensity that accompanies it, to the “submission” of the 
thinker to the displacement of art, while instructive in pointing 
up some of the differences between the philosopher and the artist 
might also prove a useful way of locating the peculiar betweenness 
of Blanchot’s work, situated somewhere between surrender and 
submission: a discussion “to come”.
Unlike surrender, which suggests resistance and struggle to the 
point of defeat (the exile of the artist from the work does not come 
easily, it is not just a question of “letting-be”, it’s not that simple) 
20
affirming solitude: Heidegger and blancHot on art
eidos nº19 (2013) págs. 11-38
issn 2011-7477
submission would seem to represent a more willing acceptance 
of, if not a position of weakness, then at least the incontrovertible 
force of the law. And so, for Heidegger, to submit (to follow/to 
be obedient) to the displacement of art is by no means a passive 
response to the overpowering anonymity of the work as it breaks 
with the human, but, is rather an act of will that must “refuse” 
the ordinary world in order to stand within and affirm truth’s self-
opening/closing space: this is for him the essence of preservation. 
In this view not only must the act of preservation renounce the 
human-all-too-human pleasures of subjectivist aesthetics, but it 
must also initiate a decisive break with the knowledge economy 
of mere “aestheticizing connoisseurship”(Heidegger, 1971a, p. 
68). In the place of knowledge is proposed instead a will-full 
knowingness —“a knowing that remains a willing, a willing that 
remains a knowing” (Heidegger, 1971a, p. 67)— that is not free to 
impose its own criteria on what does and does not count as truth 
but is, rather, in “compliance with the unconcealedness of Being”. 
(Heidegger, 1971a, p. 67). Willing and complying here are not 
opposed but can be grasped as the dual aspect of submission itself, 
where on the one hand “standing-within is brought under law” 
(Heidegger, 1971a, p. 67) while at the same time affirmed as the 
true course of art’s preservation.
As with the artist, the preserver also needs to learn the neces-
sity of saying “no”, they both need to renounce what they most 
desire: the intoxicating pleasures of the aesthetic, the ordinary 
attachments of the “they” to the things of the world. To the ex-
tent that such renunciation is viewed negatively as a giving-up 
on one’s own desires, the emphasis will fall upon compliance 
and surrender, but Heidegger’s proposal that submission to the 
“sway” of Being should be willed suggests a model of renunciation 
driven by the “yes” rather than the “no”. Thus the “no” allows 
the leaping-away from that which is repulsed but also affirmed, 
as is that which is leapt into. This doubling of renunciation and 
the entwinement of “yes” and “no” is evident in the following 
passage from Contributions to Philosophy:
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When knowing as preserving the truth of  what holds true (pre-
serving the essential sway of  the truth of  Da-sein) distinguishes 
future man […] and lifts him into the guardianship of  be-ing, 
then the highest knowing is that which is strong enough to be 
the origin of  a renunciation. We take renunciation, of  course, 
as weakness and evasion, as suspension of  the will; thus expe-
rienced, renunciation is giving-away and giving-up […] But the-
re is a renunciation that not only holds fast but also even gains 
by fighting and en-during, that renunciation that emerges as the 
preparedness for the refusal, for holding fast to this estranging 
that in such a way sways as being-itself. (Heidegger, 1999, pp. 
43-44)
As regards art, the refusal described here is the refusal to be 
seduced by the pleasures of the art object or intrigued by the 
foibles of the artist; it is the “no” necessary to clear a path for 
the affirmation of art. What is particularly noteworthy however 
is the manner in which Heidegger conceives of the creative act 
as one of fixing the work, while the preservation of art is, in fact, 
the unfixing of art and, thus, the preservation of a movement rather 
than the preservation of aesthetic objects as with connoisseurship. 
Art is the fixing in place of  a self-establishing truth in the figu-
re. This happens in creation as the bringing forth of  the uncon-
cealedness of  what is. Setting-into-work, however, also means: 
the bringing of  work-being into movement and happening. This 
happens as preservation. (Heidegger, 1971a, p. 71)
With this in mind, the different experiences of surrender and 
submission (following/obeying) might be considered with a view 
to better locating the particular work of Blanchot, a work that so 
often seems to speak with the voice of both the creator and the 
preserver, both embedded within the particularity of the work and 
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yet constantly expelled (through the detours of thinking) into the 
interminable errancy of the work’s movement and “happening”.
As suggested, the act of surrender is not only one of giving-up 
but also of giving-away. In this sense, the artist’s surrender to the 
essential solitude of art is not simply a giving-up on the aesthetic 
project and the pleasures that accompany it; the affirmation of an 
affirmative anonymity does not result in a cessation of creative 
work. It is not the creative act that is handed over to the anon-
ymous being of art but rather the artwork that has already been 
created by the artist. Thus, the experience of solitude, as Blanchot 
describes it, is actually closer to alienation than it is to the much 
less proprietorial and inherently more positive act of estrangement 
required of the Heideggerian preserver, whose renunciation of the 
“ordinary” world of works is only saying “no” to that which was 
already strange: the creative act and the createdness of the artwork. 
In fact the creator is both alienated and estranged because the “yes” 
of renunciation can only enter into this movement of art and the 
truth of Being by saying “no” to that which the creator created in 
the first place. It is a lot harder to say “no” to that which one has 
already said “yes” to than it is to renounce the work of others. If 
the job of the creator is “the fixing in place of a self-establishing 
truth in the figure”, it is not simply a matter of handing this figure 
over once fixed to the preserver to be unfixed, not least because 
what binds the creator to the creation and makes it so difficult 
to surrender to the extra-aesthetic is precisely the awareness that 
the final “yes” never truly fixes the work anyway. And this is 
not because the truth of the work is self-established outside of the 
artwork as the Heideggerian preserver would have us think but, 
rather, that (as far as the artist is concerned at least) the inherent 
untruth of the artwork renders all “yes” and “no” decisions forever 
open to revision. In this regard, the difficulty of surrendering the 
work does not relate to an aesthetic attachment to the beautiful 
fixity of the figure; but, rather, to a fascination with the “no’s” 
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secreted within it that, as an infinite potentialising force,3 fore-
ver overflow the contingency of any one aesthetic foreclosure. 
This is why artworks are so hard to finish, and why the artist is 
forever drawn back to evaluate and re-evaluate every moment of 
affirmation. And, yes, we are talking about the artist again, with 
a persistence necessitated by the issues here, and as an intended 
response to the clamour of Heideggerian (and other) philosophers 
that would outlaw such talk in the name of Being.
The creator’s renunciation of the artwork, then, is never sin-
gular but plural: it is not simply a “no” to this or that work, but to 
all of the potential works, erased but still live and radically unfi-
xed within the apparent fixity of the final (but not really so final) 
“yes”. All of this means that while artists, as Blanchot repeatedly 
indicates, are capable of affirming the solitary alterity of art and, 
in so doing, effacing and erasing their own singularity within the 
artwork, the experience of this relinquishment leaves its mark on all 
subsequent work. To be cast aside by the anonymity of the work 
while remaining under the obligation to make work is something 
the preserver of art (whether philosopher or not) does not have 
to face in the way that the artist does. What is unusual (unique) 
about Blanchot is that his account of the obligation to make work 
in the face of a “worklessness” that constantly that renders the 
figure of the artist redundant (erased/smothered)4 managed to 
open up a space of writing that significantly overlapped with the 
philosophical discourse under consideration here —just as did 
Heidegger’s in the other direction. Of course, what actual artists 
and philosophers do with this intermingling of thought is another 
question. What have they done?
Staying with this intermingling, Heidegger believes that the 
creator and the preserver “naturally belong together,” (Heidegger, 
3 “Yves Barel shows how rejection ‘potentializes’ by reproducing the rejected 
as a possibility and by incorporating it into the recursive network of  the system” 
(Luhmann, 2000, p. 33). 
4 Samual Beckett is another very rare exception.
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1971a, p.71) that they both “originate” in their “own nature”, (Hei-
degger, 1971a, p.71), and it is certainly true that, as he says, “the 
preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality 
equal to that of its creators”. But what this leaves out of account 
is that, for the artist, it is not just a question of belonging-to art and 
its preservation but also the belonging-of the artwork to the artist: 
the issue of ownership. Although, if Heidegger is to be believed, 
they “naturally belong together”, the crucial difference between the 
creator and the preserver is, then, between what might be called 
respectively the positive pleasure of owning and the neutral re-
serve of “enowning” (Ereignis). The translators of Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowning) offer an excellent introduction to this 
allusive and elusive word:
We found a good approximation to Ereignis in the word 
Enowning […] insofar as this prefix [en] conveys the sense of  
“enabling,” “bringing into condition of ” or “welling up of.” 
Thus in conjunction with owning, this prefix is capable of  get-
ting across a sense of  an “owning” that is “not an owning of  
something.” We can think this owning as an un-possessing ow-
ning, because the prefix en- has this unique capability. In this 
sense owning does not have an appropriatable content […]. 
This movement is the “going all the way into and through” 
without possessing […] the always ongoing movement “in” and 
“through” without coming to rest in a “property” or “posses-
sion.” (Heidegger, 1999, p. xx)
Heidegger himself speaks of “a thinking-saying which is en-
owned by enowning and belongs to be-ing”, (Heidegger, 1999, 
p. 3) and it is this idea of belonging-to be-ing that underpins the 
conjoining of creator and preserver as both belonging-to the “crea-
tedness” of the artwork. But again, the experience of belonging-to art 
for the creator is very different to the experience of the preserver. 
Putting aside the belonging-of  the artwork to the artist as considered 
above, we might return to the discussion of the artist’s “primordial 
choice” or “decision” to affirm art rather than the many alterna-
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tive modes of being or indeed modes of aesthetic practice. This 
might be framed by a recognition of the fact that the fascinating 
alterity of art actually leaves little room for choice as it draws the 
artist into the space of withdrawal where the “dissembling” of 
Being is staged. The significance of this is that belonging-to art 
for the creator has, in fact, got everything to do with possession, 
the possession of the artist by art —Plato’s “divine frenzy”— a 
possession that, in all of its obsessive intensity, is pre-aesthetic and, 
one might even say, the necessary condition for the artwork to 
emerge. In other words, the artist belongs-to art before the artwork 
belongs to the artist, and, thus, before any subsequent renunciation 
of the artwork associated with the affirmation of enowning. What 
the creator experiences, then, is again something double: both the 
willing-knowing submission to the (pre-aesthetic) possession of art 
and the more painful and resistant surrender to the (post-aesthetic) 
possessive-less-ness of enowning. The artist is possessed, wrests 
this possession away from art through the possessiveness of the 
creative act and the production of works, only to be dispossessed 
again by the fascination with the essential solitude of the work 
and the affirmation of that. And, in addition, having been dis-
possessed, having witnessed the effacement of the self and the 
returning affirmation of anonymity and nothingness, the artist is 
still obliged to continue making work that itself must now find a 
means of articulating the witnessing of this witnessing—a post-
aesthetic aesthetics.
By contrast, the experience of the preserver is relatively straight-
forward, although not without its own areas of difficulty. Chief 
among these is the experience of estrangement associated with 
the renunciation of the “ordinary realm” of the “they”. As Heide-
gger himself acknowledges in Being and Time the experience and 
subsequent preservation of art as cultural heritage and tradition 
is associated ontically with the “they” of which we are all a part 
(including him). “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they 
take pleasure; we read, see and judge about literature and art as 
they see and judge” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 164). Holding out for an 
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authentic gathering of the past into the present, (the early) Heide-
gger casts himself in the role of the subject who de-cisively breaks 
with the ruinous inauthenticity of the “they”, and must thus suffer 
the tragedy of this estrangement. In his later philosophy however 
Heidegger’s account of preservation and the transmission of art 
as heritage rids itself of the existential dialectics of inauthenticity 
and authenticity which, while removing the negativity associated 
with the “they” and its purported reduction of culture to forgery 
and fakery, does not on that account bring him any closer to the 
“ordinary”. On the contrary, as his thoughts on preservation deve-
lop Heidegger increasingly breaks not only with the superficiality 
of the social but also with the “lived experience” of the human, 
something he never tires of repeating in Contributions to Philosophy, 
where the increasing solitude of the artwork, and the consequent 
solitude it “draws” the preserver into, can be identified as one 
iteration of the epochal (modern) co-presence of the “machinic” 
and the “lived”. What is of interest here is the manner in which 
Heidegger conjoins art with the “machination” that he identifies 
as an essential aspect of the withdrawing (or “abandonment”) 
of Being from beings. The common and conjoining term here is 
technē which is used to describe the createdness/knowingness of 
art but also (and this is the real significance of art for Heidegger) 
the originary “makeability” of Being that is prior to human crea-
tivity, indeed, that which makes the latter possible.
The name [machination] should immediately point to making, 
which we of  course recognize as human comportment. Howe-
ver, this comportment itself  is only possible on the basis of  an 
interpretation of  beings which brings their makeability to the 
fore. (Heidegger, 1999, p. 88) 
The withdrawing of Being that “draws” the thinker should, 
then, be understood as a withdrawal from the human. The ma-
king Heidegger describes is a “self-making” that “makes itself 
by itself” (Heidegger, 1999, p. 88), a machination that has been 
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present —albeit concealed— since the inceptual thinking of the 
Greeks, but which is increasingly brought to the fore in the mo-
dern epoch though a representational thinking bound up with 
objecthood and objectivity; that is to say, the relationship of 
“man” to a world made palatable as “lived experience”. What 
Heidegger is attempting to grasp here is the idea that the apparent 
opposition between the machinic and the human (as that which 
lives) is inessential. In truth they both have a common source in 
Being, but one increasingly concealed by modern human cultures 
dominated by various liveable versions of the machinic. And it is 
the technical, the mathematical, the systematic, and so on, that 
reduces the ontological question to the ontic level of explanation, 
explication and clarification, where everything is capable of being 
revealed to the eye and/or mind; including, it should be added, 
the machination of art too, which as a “lived experience” is ex-
plained away as “solitude”. But this is not, as should be obvious, 
the more essential solitude conceived by Heidegger and Blanchot. 
In short, the introduction of Being’s machinality into life destroys 
the essential solitude in the name of an existential and aesthetic 
“loneliness” that can be explained and consumed within the 
parameters of a psychological and anthropological typology that 
makes everything “public and accessible to everyone” (Heidegger, 
1999, p.77).
The epoch of  total lack of  questioning does not tolerate anything 
worthy of  questioning and destroys any and all solitude. There-
fore, precisely this epoch must spread the word that “creative” 
men are “lonely”, and that therefore everyone is apprised and is 
promptly informed in “picture” and ‘sound” of  the loneliness of  
these lonesome men and their deeds. Here mindfulness touches 
upon what is uncanny in this epoch, knowing full well that min-
dfulness is far removed from any kind of  popular “critique of  
the times” and “psychology”. For what counts is the awareness 
that […] this epoch of  total lack of  questioning can be withstood 
only through an epoch of  simple solitude, in which preparedness 
for the truth of  be-ing itself  is prepared. (Heidegger, 1999, p. 77)
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The estrangement of the preserver of art —the thinker— is not, 
then, a social or psychological category; it has nothing whatsoever 
to do with the romanticization of the “loner” incapable or unwi-
lling to mix with the “they”, but is, rather, an ontological category 
that attempts to grasp, not the “lived experience” of the alienated 
subject, but something that describes a certain withdrawal from 
life and the familiar dialectics of alienation. But, it should be 
emphasised, such a withdrawal can by no means be understood 
as a submission to the machinic (popular within certain strains of 
postmodernism) that, as already described, itself actually depends 
upon the “lived experience” of the human as its mode or manner 
of social and psychological machination —hence it modish attrac-
tion. On the contrary, the estrangement Heidegger is thinking of 
is one that situates the thinker between the apparent (but pregiven) 
choices of “man” or “machine”, between, that is to say, the ines-
sential “yes” and “no’s” of humanists and anti-humanists alike.
The significance and originality of Heidegger’s thinking on 
solitude can be usefully highlighted here by drawing attention to 
the above concatenation of solitude and the task of questioning, 
a move that had a major influence on one of his most illustrious 
students: Hannah Arendt. But before briefly outlining their thin-
king on the subject of the question/answer, it is important to grasp 
the direction of Heidegger’s thinking. As we saw at the outset, 
Heidegger’s primary ambition as a thinker is to think “from out of” 
philosophy rather than merely “about it” or “about” other things 
(science, art […] etc.). This re-situating of the philosophical task 
is promoted by a mode of questioning that is intended to break 
with the familiar forms of philosophical dispute where question 
and answer are, in a sense, already agreed upon prior to any 
apparent disagreement. As Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes real 
questioning is not just a matter of questioning the other (think of 
the academic world) but of putting oneself into question.
We are speaking from out of  it [philosophy] only when we move 
in advance within a metaphysical questioning. Yet precisely this 
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has not happened. We merely said about this questioning that it 
is comprehensive, i.e., a questioning that in each case compre-
hends being as a whole within every question and takes the ques-
tioner himself  into the question as well, put him into question. 
(Heidegger, 1995, pp. 56-57)
In order to do this however it is essential to move away from 
the all-too-familiar dissonance of endless philosophical strife into 
an attunement not with the other (in any sociological sense) or with 
oneself (in any psychological sense) but with the being-there of the 
question itself. Unfortunately it will be necessary to curtail this 
discussion here to get straight to the main point of relevance: ques-
tioning (real questioning) requires attunement, and it is attunement 
that (in typical Heideggerian counter-intuitive fashion) produces 
and is the product of solitude. As he observes, it is precisely our 
attunement that renders us as individuals “inaccessible” (Heide-
gger, 1995, p. 66): both to ourselves and to others. As Heidegger 
insists (in a riposte to any psychoanalysts who might be reading) 
attunement is neither conscious or unconscious but must be left 
to “awaken” in a manner that concerns neither the interiority or 
the exteriority of the subject.
[…] attunement imposes itself  on everything. It is not at all “in-
side” in some interiority, only to appear in the flash of  an eye: 
but for this reason it is not at all outside either. (Heidegger, 1995, 
p. 66)
So, in much abbreviated form, this is how questioning and 
solitude are drawn together by Heidegger, just as Blanchot will 
do something similar with affirmation and solitude.
On the face of it Hannah Arendt posits a comparable distinc-
tion between loneliness and solitude. But it is the fundamental 
difference of her account that might help clarify the radically new 
space Heidegger is working to open up and become attuned to. 
In The Life of  the Mind Arendt writes the following:
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Thinking, existentially speaking, is a solitary but not a lonely 
business; solitude is that human condition in which I keep my-
self  company. Loneliness comes about when I am alone without 
being able to split up into the two-in-one, without being able 
to keep myself  company […]. Nothing perhaps indicates more 
strongly that man exists essentially in the plural than that his so-
litude actualizes his merely being conscious of  himself  […] into 
a duality during the thinking activity. It is this duality of  myself  
with myself  that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am 
both the one who asks and who answers. Thinking can become 
dialectical and critical because it goes through this questioning 
and answering process. (Arendt, 1978, p.185)
The importance of this passage is that solitude is posited as a 
philosophical rather than a merely social category entangled in 
the vagaries of intersubjectivity. However, the fact remains that, 
for all of her familiarity with and admiration for Heidegger’s 
thought, Arendt’s conception of solitude continues to be inesca-
pably metaphysical in its rooting of the plurality of inner dialogue 
in the Kantian account of aesthetic judgement and the radically 
non-Heidegerrian dialectics of question and answer. Strangely then, 
Arendt’s conception of solitude is both aesthetic and dialectical, 
the very things that Heidegger is so committed to overcoming.
Taking each of these —the aesthetic and the dialectical— in 
turn, compare the following remarks from Arendt’s Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy, which draws heavily on Kant’s concept 
of aesthetic judgement, with what Heidegger has to say in his own 
Kant and the Problem of  Metaphysics.
Critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut 
itself  off  from “all others”. To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, 
but by the force of  imagination it makes the others present and 
thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; 
in other words it adopts the position of  Kant’s world citizen. To 
think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one’s 
imagination to go visiting. (Arendt, 1981, p. 45)
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The solitude Arendt is describing here is one that avoids lo-
neliness through the introduction of a dialogical structure that 
provides a home (or a place to “visit” at least) for the inherently 
nomadic movement of the imagination. By following Kant in his 
deployment of the imagination as an intermediary between sense 
and understanding, and also casting this in the (similarly Kantian) 
terms of singularity and universality (private/public), she manages 
to forge a philosophical link between self and other that, while 
imaginary, is still capable of informing the “lived-experience” of 
human existence. 
In his Kant and the Problem of  Metaphysics Heidegger famously 
accuses Kant of shying away from the radical implications of his 
own conception of the imagination in such a way that human un-
derstanding is protected from its uncanny, unknown and inhuman 
root: indeed, the root of solitude.
This original, essential constitution of  humankind, “rooted” in 
the transcendental power of  the imagination, is the “unknown” 
into which Kant must have looked if  he spoke of  the “unknown 
root to us”, for the unknown is not that of  which we simply 
know nothing. Rather, it is what pushes against us as something 
disquieting in what is known. (Heidegger, 1990, p. 110)
Contra Arendt, Heidegger is keen to emphasise the fact that, 
for him, the imagination is “without strings” and demonstrates a 
“peculiar non-connectedness to being” (Heidegger, 1990, p. 89) 
rendering it essentially “homeless”. Where she holds fast to the 
“critical” dimension of Kant’s thought, the thinking about thinking 
that requires the bifurcation of the self, thus allowing the reflective 
subject to “keep itself company”; and where she draws upon what 
she understands as his dialogical concept of aesthetic judgement, 
“the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue,” (Arendt, 1978, p. 193). 
Heidegger conceives of thinking as a radically solitary activity, 
something much less comforting, much less homely. This is how 
he presents it in the essay “Building Dwelling Thinking”:
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What if  man’s homelessness consisted in this, that man still does 
not even think of  the real plight of  dwelling as the plight? Yet 
as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery 
no longer. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the 
sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling. (Heidegger, 
1971b, p. 161).
Unlike Arendt’s critical thinker who goes “visiting”, thus taking 
up residence with an imagined other, Heidegger’s dweller-thinker 
is always already in residence, already within (and ideally attuned 
to) the homelessness that is thinking itself. To learn to dwell within 
the homeless solitude of essential thought is not to be called by 
the dialogical other but, as we have seen before, is to be “drawn” 
or “called” into the withdrawing of Being —the abandonment of 
dialogue— a movement that can only be preserved by entering 
into its very uncanniness. Heidegger insists upon the proximity of 
the alien —the un-homeliness of the homely, the unfamiliarity of 
the familiar— so that, as he says, we feel disquiet as the unknown 
“pushes up against us”. So, again we see here a distinction between 
loneliness and solitude, but one that has nothing to do with the 
absence or presence of dialogue. For Heidegger it is the homeless 
who, in their “misery”, are lonely; while those who willingly dwell 
within the homelessness of imagining and thinking —who affirm 
it— are solitary.
In light of the above discussion, it might be useful, as a way of 
linking some of these thoughts together, to re-affirm this affirma-
tion of solitude by means of a preliminary reversal of the question/
answer binary. Where Heidegger positions solitude within the 
in-betweeness of the question, Blanchot (and here again he speaks 
as an artist) suggests that it is the affirmative nature of answering 
(prior to the question) that produces solitude. If this makes sense 
then Rudi Visker’s confident assumption that “it is far better to 
have some unanswered questions than to have plenty of unques-
tioned answers” (Visker, 1999, p. 263) might itself prove to be an 
unquestioned answer.
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To begin with, a passage from Blanchot’s The Infinite Conver-
sation: he is discussing the thought of Simone Weil:
[…] for her the answer always comes first, preceding every 
question and even every possibility of  questioning: there is an 
answer, then another and then again another answer. These 
answers often do not coincide, and even profoundly contradict 
one another […]; but she leaves them as they are, without seeming 
to renounce any of  them, much less bring them into agreement. 
Affirming is often for Simone Weil a way of  questioning or a way 
of  testing […].The kind of  invisible effort by which she seeks to 
efface herself  in favour of  certitude is all that remains in her of  a 
will as she advances from affirmation to affirmation […]. No one 
has doubted less than she did. (Blanchot, 1993, p. 108)
This is not a simple reversal of questioning and answering, it 
is, rather, a challenge to, if not an out and out subversion of, dia-
lectical logic and the very dynamics of doubt. What is difficult to 
grasp here is the sense in which an answer can be prised free from 
a prior question and be allowed to stand on its own, in its own 
space where certitude rather than certainty is the key driver. The 
when? how? what? why? of questioning always opens out onto 
an interpersonal space where the desire for certainty inevitably 
draws the questioner into the dialogical orbit of the answerer, even 
if this is an interior dialogue as described by Arendt. The space 
opened by what we might call the affirmative logic of the answer 
is different to both the singularity of “loneliness” and the “two in 
one” of “solitude”. Clearly, Blanchot’s fascination with Simone 
Weil can partly be explained by the essential solitude her thought 
both articulates and affirms. And in particular it is the manner in 
which she affirms affirmation, with a certitude that both precedes 
and remains immune to the dialectical probing of the question 
and the questioner, that effaces the self and reduces the call and 
response to the “blank and monotone voice” (Blanchot, 1993, p. 
108) that will “never yield inasmuch as impersonal truth is inca-
pable of making concessions” (Blanchot, 1993, p.109). But above 
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all, certitude, and particularly the solitude that accompanies it, is 
not simply affirmed but is itself the very product of affirmation: 
pure affirmation creates solitude.
To choose loneliness is to take occupation of a pregiven space, 
one that seems to have cleared out the “they” but which hasn’t 
really, not least because it is a space specifically created by the 
“they” for the sole purpose of humanising solitude and consuming 
it as a lifestyle. Solitude, on the other hand, is not a choice but a 
de-cision, a cutting away from the either/or of loneliness or gre-
gariousness, and with it a cutting away from the “I” that would 
choose this or that. Solitude is not a quality or characteristic of 
the individual “I” but an inescapable attribute of the artwork. 
But, and this is the essential point, as the creator (Blanchot) and 
the preserver (Heidegger and Blanchot) of the artwork, the im-
pact of the work’s solitude on the artist demands a complete and 
constant re-thinking and re-doing of thinking and doing —as a 
lived moment— that can only be substantially experienced at the 
ontic level of “the they” and the subsequent psycho-dramas of 
the “lonely” ones. Naturally, these dramas need to be radically 
transformed in the light of the ontological predicament identified 
by the post aesthetic aesthetics being imagined here, but dramas 
they remain —without that it is hard to imagine how artworks 
could actually be produced. But, of course, that is not a philoso-
phical issue; it is an artistic and aesthetic one. Artists are artists 
not because they ask and answer aesthetic questions but because 
they affirm the artwork, this affirmation is the answer that precedes 
all questioning. The affirmation of the work does not say that it 
is good or bad, right or wrong, happy or sad; it simply says “here 
it is”, or in Blanchot’s words: “What it says is exclusively this: 
that it is —and nothing more” (Blanchot, 1983, p. 22). As with 
Simone Weil, and to this extent she is an artist above all else, the 
affirmation of the work is the affirmation of a force that effaces 
the self or, as Blanchot describes it, a silence that “has its source 
in the effacement toward which the writer is drawn” (Blanchot, 
1983, p. 27). Blanchot also considers the de-cisive force of art and, 
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once again, understands decision as an attribute of the artwork 
not of the artist. It is here that we begin to see more clearly the 
concatenation of decision, affirmation and solitude, not as stages 
in an aesthetic process but as the very source or being of art; for 
the artwork is, as Blanchot affirms, speaking of the predicament of 
the writer: “The very decision which dismisses him, cuts him off, 
makes of him a survivor, without work” (Blanchot, 1983, p. 24).
So to be clear, the artist does not decide to affirm the work 
which, in turn, dismisses that artist back into the solitude of 
worklessness: that is far too linear (and rather pointless). To begin 
with, the decision to affirm is already the affirmation of decision 
and, to repeat, decision is itself already the cutting away not only 
from the “they” but also from the “loner” who would avoid, but 
nevertheless belongs to the “they”. Solitude is not to be alone, it 
is to be without work, where worklessness (central to Blanchot’s 
thought) has nothing to do with lack of employment —the artist 
is well employed— but with the lack of a work. It is precisely not 
denial but, rather, the affirmation of the work that cuts it adrift 
from the artist. 
But why would one want to affirm such solitude? Why would 
the artist want to end up a “survivor without work”? Perhaps the 
answer is implicit in the terminology; the survival of the artist is 
utterly dependent on the ability to escape the dubious totality of 
the work once the inevitable process of reification sets in. Where 
the “yes” and “no” of the creative process refers to the working 
of the work, the final affirmation affirms the work as “work” 
and thus dismisses the creator and welcomes the preserver. The 
greatest danger to the artist is the desire to hang onto the work 
and hold it within the fixity of the creative process, rather than 
allowing it to enter into the unfixity of preservation. Such a 
desire is dangerous because the collapsing of the artist and the 
artwork into one another sets up the familiar intentional and/or 
expressivist chiasmus that is responsible not only for obscuring 
what Heidegger would call the essence or origin of art, but also 
of trapping all thinking about art within the realms of the aesthe-
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tic and the romantic/modernist metaphysics of loneliness5. The 
affirmation of art’s inhuman incessancy releases the work into 
the movement of unconcealment/concealment that draws the 
(following/obedient) thinker behind it, but also releases the artist 
into the worklessness necessary to start work again. Only through 
the affirmation of this, the essential solitude, can the artist survive. 
But who is the survivor, what is survival? This raises again the 
question of the possibility and the nature of a post-Heideggerian 
art form; not one that ignores his thought but one that properly 
engages with it, and survives. This has been described throughout 
as a post-aesthetic aesthetics, not a return to one or other variant 
of humanist metaphysics, but rather the acknowledgement that, 
after witnessing such thinking, the artist cannot simply carry on 
in the same old way.
So, what changes? What can change? One thing is certain, the 
same new ways are as irrelevant to this discussion as the same 
old ones. This is not about old and new, then and now, which is 
why the widespread accusation (often by artists) that Heidegger 
is only concerned with the artistic masterpieces of the past are so 
wide of the mark. The “other beginning” of inceptual thinking 
does not require a “leap” backwards but a leap “out of ”, with the 
emphasis now very much placed upon the “outing” of thought 
and a trajectory that seeks the “Outside”: the space between. As 
both Heidegger and Blanchot recognise in their different ways, 
this is the space that has always been occupied by the artist. A 
post-Heidegerrian, post-aesthetics aesthetic does not create a new 
space, it names the space that the essential solitude of art creates, 
only to dismiss the artist (and the preserver) into it. What is new 
is the name, or the attempt to name, this space and the consequent 
re-consideration and re-figuration of all art work, past, present, fu-
ture. Such work could not be thought without the philosopher, but 
it could not be made, thought and then remade without the artist.
5 Arnold Schoenberg and Adorno on Schoenberg being cases in point.
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Sun tzu dijo:
“Si eres hábil en el manejo del ejército,
lleva a tus hombres de la mano,
como si se tratase de una sola persona.
De ese modo no retrocederán”.
